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Abstract
This paper studies spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of sovereign
rating changes. We compile an extensive dataset covering all announcements by the
three major agencies (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, Fitch) and daily sovereign bond
market movements of up to 73 developed and emerging countries between 1994 and
2011. To cleanly identify the existence of spillover effects, we perform an explicit
counterfactual analysis which pits bond market reactions to small revisions in ratings
against reactions to all other, more major changes. We also control for the environment
in which an announcement is made, such as the anticipation through watchlistings and
the interaction of similar rating actions by different agencies. While there is strong
evidence of negative spillover effects in response to downgrades, positive spillovers
from upgrades are much more limited at best. Furthermore, negative spillover effects
are more pronounced for countries within the same region. Strikingly, this cannot be
explained by fundamental linkages and similarities between countries.
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1 Introduction
Ever since tensions began to surface in the eurozone in late 2009, the announcements by
credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the creditworthiness of member states have continuously
made the headlines and rattled financial markets. In particular, while not specific to the
ongoing crisis, the notion that rating actions pertaining to one country might have a major
impact on the yields of other countries’ sovereign bonds, too, has regained the attention of
policymakers. In fact, concerns over so-called negative spillover effects have been running so
deep that the European Commission was at one stage considering a temporary restriction
on the issuance of ratings under exceptional circumstances (Financial Times, 2011). This
provides the background for why the Commission has just recently set up stricter rules for
the agencies. In particular, CRAs are now only allowed to issue three ratings for EU member
states’ sovereign debt at pre-defined dates every year (European Union, 2013).
These considerations carry two major assumptions on the behaviour of sovereign bond mar-
kets in the wake of rating announcements. The first assumption is that, when a rating
announcement is made for one country, there exist significant spillover effects on other
countries’ sovereign bond markets. Conditional on their existence, the second assumption
posits that such spillovers must, in one way or another, be unwarranted to merit an inter-
vention by the state. In more technical terms, it suggests that spillovers are unrelated to
economic fundamentals. While both assumptions are highly policy relevant and therefore
deserve close scrutiny, they are not straightforward to test.
This paper sets out to cleanly identify the existence of cross-border spillover effects of
sovereign rating announcements, and to establish the economic conditions under which
those effects are strongest, or which countries are affected most. To this end, we collect an
extensive dataset which comprises a complete history of both the sovereign rating actions by
the “Big Three” (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market
movements for up to 73 countries between 1994 and 2011. The dataset contains substantial
variation as it covers both crisis and non-crisis periods as well as a broad set of developed
and emerging countries across all continents.
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Crucially, the variation allows us to pursue a novel empirical strategy to identify potential
spillover effects. More precisely, we perform an explicit counterfactual analysis which pits
bond market reactions to small revisions in an agency’s assessment of a country’s creditwor-
thiness against bond market reactions to all other, more major changes. This not only helps
us get around the problems associated with a classic event-study approach in a spillover
context. It also does not require the additional assumptions made by a number of papers.
A traditional event-study procedure, where bond market movements in an estimation win-
dow serve as the counterfactual for bond market reactions in an event window, is suitable
in principle but, in a spillover context, places too high demands on the necessary non-
contamination of the estimation window. This is because, if one entertains the possibility
of cross-border spillovers after rating announcements, each country’s bond yields are po-
tentially affected by any sovereign rating change in the world. The estimation window can
therefore only be considered uncontaminated if no such change has occurred anywhere. As
the number of instances where this can be ensured is extremely low, the classic event-study
approach appears ill-suited to thoroughly identify spillover effects. Hence, in this paper, we
focus on a pooled cross section of short event windows, in which small changes of the actual
rating serve as the counterfactual for larger changes.
While some papers also investigate spillovers in a pooled cross section framework, their
analyses do not postulate an explicit counterfactual, as we do.1 Instead, they rely on a
“comprehensive credit rating” which combines two different types of rating announcements
— actual rating changes and watch, or review, changes — into a single scale. Their iden-
tification therefore depends on rather strong additional assumptions on the relative infor-
mational content of reviews and ratings. We, however, focus solely on the class of actual
rating changes. In detail, we test whether a country’s sovereign bonds react more heavily
to upgrades or downgrades elsewhere when those are “large” — ie, when the actual rating
changes by two notches or more. The group of “small” one-notch changes serves as the
counterfactual during that exercise. At the same time, we explicitly allow for differences in
the informational content of sovereign rating changes by controlling for watchlistings that
1See Afonso et al. (2012), Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012), Gande and Parsley (2005), and Ismailescu
and Kazemi (2010).
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may build anticipation in the market. Moreover, we are also able to account for the fact
that an announcement is often followed by a similar one from a different agency soon after,
which may further influence the reception of the later announcements.2
Our findings on the existence of cross-border spillover effects point to an important asymme-
try in the sovereign debt market’s treatment of ratings. On the one hand, we find significant
spillovers in the wake of sovereign rating downgrades, which turn out to be robust to a num-
ber of tests. On the other hand, reactions to upgrades appear to be much more muted, if
anything.
We then investigate to what extent spillovers are driven by country characteristics. Impor-
tantly, we find that spillovers from downgrades tend to be significantly more pronounced for
countries within the same region. We proceed by testing whether this can be explained by
bilateral trade linkages, financial integration or fundamental similarities between countries.
However, even after controlling for these factors, we still find that belonging to a common
region amplifies cross-border spillover effects. Hence, our findings suggest that policymakers’
concerns over some countries being found “guilty by association” cannot be easily dismissed.
Our paper is related to a broad strand of literature that investigates the effects of sovereign
rating announcements on different segments of the financial markets. The most common
exercise is to conduct an event study gauging the direct impact of rating changes on the
bonds issued by the country concerned. However, there is also a substantial body of research
analysing the reaction of the country’s stock and, more recently, of its CDS market. As
a general result, this literature finds a strong and significant impact of sovereign rating
downgrades, while upgrades have an insignificant or more limited impact (see, eg, Cantor
and Packer, 1996; Larra´ın et al., 1997; Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Brooks et al., 2004;
Hooper et al., 2008; Hill and Faff, 2010).
Moreover, in recent years a growing body of research has specifically studied whether
sovereign rating changes also lead to spillover effects on other countries’ sovereign bonds.
Generally speaking, the literature affirms the existence of such spillovers, meaning that a
rating action on one country is found to significantly affect the sovereign bond prices of other
2To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider such interactions between the major CRAs
in identifying spillover effects.
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countries (eg, Arezki et al., 2011; De Santis, 2012; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). Some stud-
ies also point out that spillovers are not limited to sovereign debt markets but that rating
changes also affect foreign stock and exchange markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002;
Arezki et al., 2011; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012). Regarding a potential asymmetry in
the spillover effects of negative and positive rating events, the results of the literature so far
remain inconclusive. Whereas Afonso et al. (2012) find spillovers to matter most for down-
grades, with little or no effects of sovereign upgrades, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find
positive rating events to have a greater spillover effect on foreign CDS prices than negative
ones.
With the exception of Gande and Parsley (2005), these studies focus either on spillover
effects during specific regional crisis episodes3 or on an otherwise homogeneous sample of
countries only, such as emerging countries (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Kaminsky and
Schmukler, 2002). In addition to some of the shortcomings already mentioned above, this
leaves open the question to what extent their findings are of more general relevance.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset and highlight
some important characteristics of rating announcements. Section 3 discusses the estimation
strategy for identifying cross-border spillovers. Section 4 presents our empirical results and
discusses their interpretation. We end with a brief conclusion.
2 Data
2.1 The dataset
For our study, we compile a broad dataset of the yields of publicly traded sovereign bonds at
daily frequency. The dataset starts in January 1994 and ends in December 2011. Whereas
our dataset only comprises sovereign bonds issued by 27 countries in 1994, this number
increases to 74 countries towards the end of our sample period. This reflects both the
increased financing needs of sovereigns and the growing prevalence of bond issuance, as
3See Afonso et al. (2012), Arezki et al. (2011), and De Santis (2012) for the eurozone crisis, Kaminsky
and Schmukler (1999) for the 1997/98 Asian crisis.
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Figure 1: Number of sovereign bonds in dataset
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sovereign bond sample between 1994
and 2011, highlighting a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries are classified according
to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
opposed to bank financing, during the last 20 years. While for 1994 sovereign bond yields
are mostly available for developed countries, the availability of emerging market bond yields
picks up heavily over our sample period. Towards the end of the period, emerging markets
even account for the bulk of sovereign bonds in the sample. Figure 1 illustrates the increasing
scope of our dataset over time.
In order to consider a broad spectrum of sovereign bonds, our sample draws on data from
different sources. Our preferred data source is Bloomberg, from which we use generic 10-year
yields for up to 33 countries. If data are not available on Bloomberg, we supplement them
with yields from Datastream’s 10-year Government Bond Benchmark Index. We also use
data from the JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (henceforth EMBI Global,
see JP Morgan, 1999).4
For the purpose of our later analysis, we compute sovereign bond spreads. The spread is
the differential of the country’s sovereign bond yield over that of a US Treasury bond of
comparable maturity. We use 10-year maturities where possible, which is the case for the
developed economies and some emerging markets. For the other emerging economies, we
rely on the EMBI Global data. As those correspond to different maturities, we obtain the
relevant US Treasury yields by interpolating from the closest published yield curve rates.
4While bonds included in the EMBI Global have to fulfil strict requirements regarding the availability
of reliable daily prices, the average maturity of a country’s bond index can vary remarkably from that of
the other two sources. We therefore control for maturity in all regressions.
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Figure 2: Number of rated countries
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sample of countries rated by at least
one of the major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) between 1994 and 2011, with a notable increase in the coverage of
emerging economies over time. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
Information on sovereign ratings comes from the rating agencies’ websites and includes daily
information both on rating changes and on sovereign watchlistings by any of the “Big Three”
(S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) from 1994 to 2011. Like the number of publicly traded sovereign
bonds, the scope and composition of countries rated by the “Big Three” changes quite
substantially during our sample period. While in 1994 only 34 sovereigns were rated by at
least one of the agencies, this number had increased to 98 countries by 2011 (see Figure 2).
2.2 Characteristics of rating announcements
Over the whole sample period, we are able to consider a total of 1,097 rating changes, of
which 635 were upgrades and 462 downgrades. In general, one can observe a significant
increase in the number of sovereign credit ratings during our sample period, particularly in
emerging market countries.
As Figure 3 illustrates, rating activity is not evenly distributed over time but, especially for
downgrades, shows some hefty peaks during specific episodes of crisis. Whereas in “normal
times”, downgrades tend to be relatively scarce, a severe increase can be observed in the
context of the 1997/98 Asian crisis (affecting mostly emerging countries plus South Korea
and Hong Kong) and following the 2008–2011 financial and European debt crises (where
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Figure 3: Rating actions over time
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Notes — This figure shows upgrades and downgrades of developed and emerging economies made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch
between 1994 and 2011. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
for the first time advanced economies were exposed to downgrades at a large scale). This
means that similar announcements tend to cluster around certain time periods.
In addition, it is an important stylised fact that the downgrading of a country is frequently
followed by yet another downgrade announcement for that same country soon after. This
is all the more probable because there is a strong overlap in country coverage by the “Big
Three”. Almost all countries in our sample are rated by more than one agency only and
most are even rated by all three (70 out of 98 countries at the end of 2011). Hence, in
what we term within-clustering, different agencies may make the same announcement for a
given country in short succession or even on the same day. Figure 4 illustrates this issue
by plotting the cumulative distribution function and summary statistics of the number of
days between similar rating actions on the same country. As can be seen, clustering is
particularly pronounced for downgrades. In around five per cent of all cases, a downgrade
on a country is followed by another downgrade on that country within just one day. For
example, in the course of the Asian crisis, S&P, Fitch and Moody’s all downgraded South
Korea’s credit rating on successive days between 25 and 27 November 1997.
The presence of clustering might be of crucial importance when examining the spillover
effects from a rating announcement since its informational content is likely to vary depending
on whether it has been announced in isolation or just a few days after (or even on the same
day as) a similar announcement by another agency. Not to control for these cases could
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Figure 4: Clustering of rating announcements
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seriously bias estimation results for the impart of rating announcements on sovereign bond
markets.
Clustering across countries may matter, too. When CRAs change the rating of a number
of different countries in the same direction simultaneously, one needs to control for the
fact that some countries will then be both “non-event” and event countries. Otherwise,
one might erroneously detect spillovers across sovereign bond markets when, in fact, one is
looking at a spillover in ratings. This is all the more important if the countries concerned
share a common trait of some form which leads CRAs to make simultaneous announcements
for the countries concerned in the first place, as appears to have happened on 3 October 2008
when Fitch downgraded Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is therefore a major advantage
of our dataset that it enables us to explicitly take into account prior and parallel rating
actions by other CRAs and on other countries.
Similarly, the informational content of a rating change might be conditional on whether it
has been preceded by the respective country being put on a watchlist. As the literature on
the effects of rating announcements on the refinancing conditions of the very same country
shows (eg, Afonso et al., 2012; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010), rating changes are often
preceded by a similar change in the market’s assessment of sovereign risk, especially when
countries have been put “on watch”, or “review”, before.5 Ignoring these anticipation
5In the following, we use the two terms interchangeably. While S&P and Fitch issue watchlistings, in
the Moody’s terminology those are called “reviews”.
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effects risks underestimating bond market reactions to a sovereign rating action. Since our
dataset includes all sovereign watchlistings by the “Big Three”, we can directly control for
a country’s watchlist status and mitigate potential problems with anticipation.
3 Identifying sovereign spillovers
3.1 Counterfactual choice and estimation strategy
The existence of rating spillover effects in the sovereign debt market requires, by definition,
that the announcement by a CRA on the creditworthiness of one country (event country)
impacts significantly on the bond yields of another (non-event country). Yet, the mere
observation of a change in non-event country yields when an event-country announcement
is made does not suffice to establish a causal relation because non-event country yields might
have changed regardless. Hence, the key issue in identifying potential spillover effects is to
find a suitable counterfactual.
We cannot apply the procedure traditionally used in event studies on direct announcement
effects, however. This strand of literature focuses on, for instance, the bond yield response
of a sovereign that has been downgraded. In this framework, effects are identified by the
existence of abnormal returns, meaning that around the announcement (event window),
returns are significantly different from normal, as estimated over a longer time frame be-
fore the announcement (estimation window). In order to be a reasonable guide to normal
returns, the estimation window has to be chosen such that other events with a potentially
significant impact on returns are excluded (see, eg, MacKinlay, 1997). In other words, the
counterfactual for gauging the impact of rating announcements is “no rating change”. While
this represents a challenge in direct announcement studies already, which focus on countries
in isolation, the identification of spillover effects based on this counterfactual is essentially
impossible.
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The reason is that, in a spillover context, we would require that there be no announcements
on any rated country within the estimation window.6 There is obviously a trade-off be-
tween the length of that window and the number of announcements eligible for inclusion
in the estimation. However, even at a 30-day length commonly used in sovereign event
studies, which is towards the shorter end of the event-study literature more generally, only
23 upgrades would be eligible, and 36 downgrades.
We therefore pursue an identification strategy that does not rely on “no rating change
at all” as its counterfactual, but which discriminates between rating changes according to
their severity. More precisely, rating changes of a single notch serve as the counterfactual for
more severe changes of two notches or more.7 This approach is implemented in the following
estimation equation, which we run on upgrades and downgrades separately:
∆Spreadn,t = α + β · LARGEe,t +RatEnve,n,t · γ +Othere,n,t · δ + ωe,n,t .
The dependent variable ∆Spreadn,t is the change in non-event country n’s bond spread vis-a`-
vis the United States over the two-trading-day window [−1,+1] around the announcement
on day 0 of a change in the rating of event country e (6= n). The event window length
accounts for the fact that by the time a CRA announces a rating change on day 0, markets
in some parts of the world may have already closed. Hence, any impact on those would not
materialise before day +1, and would go undetected using a shorter [−1, 0] window. The
same argument applies to rating announcements made after the exchange has closed in the
country concerned, which we cannot distinguish from those made during trading.8
The key regressor in identifying possible spillover effects is LARGEe,t, a dummy that takes
on a value of one if e’s rating is changed by two notches or more, and zero otherwise. We
thereby treat rating changes of two notches or more as one single group. This is due to the
6The universe of all rated countries is the relevant benchmark when analysing potential spillover effects
in this framework. Of course, if we only required the estimation window to be free of announcements
pertaining to the non-event country, the number of events eligible for inclusion would increase substantially.
However, this would amount to assuming from the outset that only direct effects, as opposed to spillover
effects, could possibly matter, which would defy the purpose of the investigation.
7We map CRAs’ letter ratings into a linear 17-notch scale following Afonso et al. (2012).
8CRAs have made post-trading announcements during the eurozone crisis, for instance (Financial Times,
2010; Wall Street Journal, 2012). In financial markets more generally, information which is deemed highly
relevant is frequently released when exchanges are closed in order to limit or smooth the impact on prices.
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Figure 5: Distribution of rating changes
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes, measured on a 17-notch scale. Numbers are based
on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635 upgrades, 462 downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s and Fitch between 1994
and 2011.
distribution of the severity of upgrades and downgrades in our sample, which is shown in
Figure 5.
The vast majority of rating announcements result in a one-notch change in a country’s
rating. Beyond that, we observe a significant amount of events only for changes of two
notches, while changes of three notches or more occur only very rarely. Therefore, we do
not include separate dummy variables for the latter categories but group all rating changes
of two notches or more into a single bin.
In this framework, positive (negative) spillover effects are equivalent to a drop (rise) in the
spreads of country n which is significantly more pronounced in response to a two-or-more-
notches upgrade (downgrade) of country e than to a single-notch one. We would then expect
β to be significantly negative (positive) in the upgrade (downgrade) regressions.
This counterfactual choice also has implications for the estimation technique. Since we do
not use “no change” as the counterfactual (due to the estimation window problem outlined
above), we identify spillover effects in pooled cross sections of upgrades and downgrades
rather than in a true panel setup.9 We estimate the model by OLS.
At this point, it seems important to address some potential concerns about a possible
endogeneity of the large-change dummy. The implicit assumption in the above design is
that the rating announcement and its severity are not systematically related to other spread-
9Thus, t denotes generic rather than actual time and can be thought of as indexing the different rating
events.
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relevant information in the event window. Otherwise, LARGE and the error term ω would
be correlated, and β would be biased.
One concern might be, for instance, that CRAs downgrade a country instantaneously in
reaction to “bad news” and do so by more notches for “particularly bad news”. Note that
an instantaneous response to other spread-relevant information per se would not induce
any endogeneity in our framework whereas “fine-tuning” the severity of rating changes,
conditional on an immediate response, clearly would. Hence, we demonstrate that there is
very little to suggest instantaneous-response behaviour on the part of CRAs to begin with,
and that endogeneity is therefore not a major issue in this regard. We would like to stress
two points in particular.
Restricting the event window to two days already goes a long way towards alleviating the
problem by limiting the amount of information that might potentially correlate with the
large-change dummy. In other words, the scope for other relevant news to incite an immedi-
ate reaction from CRAs is rather small, even if such behaviour was characteristic of rating
agencies and their announcements.
In addition, the proclaimed practice and a corresponding body of empirical literature sug-
gest otherwise. The agencies state a preference for stable ratings (see, eg, Cantor, 2001;
Cantor and Mann, 2003, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, 2010), intending to announce a change
only if it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. This “through the cycle” approach
contrasts with a “point in time” approach in that cyclical phenomena should not, in them-
selves, trigger rating changes. If CRAs actually pursued a stable rating policy, the fact that
cyclical and permanent factors are difficult to disentangle (International Monetary Fund,
2010) should imply some delay between new information becoming available and an ensuing
change in the credit rating. Empirical evidence for corporate bond rating indicates that
this practice is indeed followed, thus reducing the timeliness of rating changes (Altman and
Rijken, 2004; Liu et al., 2011), and that the CRAs are “slow” in processing new information
(Lo¨ffler, 2005). This perception has also been expressed in investor surveys (Association for
Financial Professionals, 2002; Baker and Mansi, 2002). Moreover, Sy (2004) notes for the
sovereign sector that it may simply be concerns about rating changes precipitating signifi-
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cant increases in borrowing costs or outright crises which make CRAs opt for somewhat less
timely announcements.
A second concern might be biases arising from differences across agencies in a pooled setup,
as pointed out by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012).10 Suppose, for example, that the large
rating changes in our sample stemmed primarily from an agency in whose judgments the
market placed more trust. Then, by pooling the announcements of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch,
we would be picking up differences in the credibility of these CRAs rather than identifying
spillover effects across sovereign bond markets. However, Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows
that this is not very likely, in particular for downgrades where changes of two notches or
more are distributed quite evenly across agencies: 32 for S&P, 46 for Moody’s, and 30 for
Fitch.11 We are therefore confident that our approach provides a sound identification of
spillover effects.
3.2 The rating environment
The rating environment may play an important role for the bond market reaction to an
upgrade or downgrade announcement. Our regressions therefore control for a number of
different rating variables, contained in RatEnve,n,t. For example, the spillover potential of
a rating action might depend on the creditworthiness of the event country, which we proxy
by its credit rating (InitRate,t). We also include the absolute difference between the event
country’s initial rating and that of the non-event country (∆InitRate,n,t) as one might expect
bilateral effects to differ depending on how similar countries are in terms of creditworthiness.
In addition, the impact of rating announcements may vary according to whether they have
been anticipated by the market (eg, Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Gande and Parsley, 2005;
Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999). One potentially important and convenient measure of such
anticipation is whether the actual rating action has been foreshadowed by a CRA putting
the respective country on watch, or review (Afonso et al., 2012; Kaminsky and Schmukler,
10At the same time, the authors acknowledge that studies using pooled data (eg, Kaminsky and Schmukler,
2002; Sy, 2004) constitute the norm in the literature as opposed to examining rating changes by CRAs
separately.
11While the picture is not quite as unambiguous for upgrades, we have already stressed in the introduction
that those results should be taken with more of a grain of salt (see next section).
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2002). Hence, we add a dummy indicating whether a review in the indicated direction has
been ongoing at the time of the upgrade or downgrade (OnWatche,t).
Introducing an explicit control variable differs from Gande and Parsley (2005), who amal-
gamate a country’s watch status into a “comprehensive credit rating”. More precisely, for
any given day their measure is defined as the country’s actual letter rating on a 17-notch
scale, raised (lowered) if the country is on review for an upgrade (downgrade). Presumably
due to the counterfactual issue discussed in 3.1, Gande and Parsley (2005) then focus on
those days as events on which there is a non-zero change in the comprehensive credit rating.
However, this identification crucially involves additional assumptions on how changes in
review status and actual rating changes relate to one another quantitatively. Furthermore,
one might argue that, despite the potential anticipation effects of watchlistings, the latter
are not qualitatively the same as actual rating changes. In any case, our much larger sample
allows us to avoid those assumptions. We focus instead on the class of actual rating changes
and their relative strengths only while controlling for anticipation through watchlistings.
This should provide for a cleaner identification of spillover effects.
Moreover, we have shown in 2.2 that similar announcements by different CRAs tend to
cluster around certain dates, and that this is particularly true for rating downgrades. We
account for potential clustering within countries by a variable which captures the number
of similar announcements made for a particular country by other agencies over a 14-day
window before the respective event (SimActsWdwEvte,t). For clustering across countries,
ie one or more CRAs changing the rating of more than one country in the same direction
simultaneously, we include the number of similar announcements made on the same day for
the“non-event” country (SimActsDayNonEvte,t).
Finally, we add the volatility measure for the S&P 500 Index in the United States (VIXt) to
control for the “global market sentiment” in which the rating announcement is made. One
might, for instance, imagine that in more turbulent times (ie, in which volatility is high)
borrowing conditions deteriorate across the board, so that spreads over the event window
would be more likely to increase in any case. In that sense, VIXt can be regarded as a
technical control, which also adds a genuine time component to the pooled cross sections.
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All regressions include the vector Othere,n,t which contains a fixed set of controls, such
as event and non-event country dummies. We also account for common time effects in
the pooled cross sections through the inclusion of year dummies. These capture global
macroeconomic trends which might be reflected in the yields of US Treasuries and, hence,
spread changes. Moreover, each regression includes the following technical controls: the
maturity of non-event country bonds in levels and squares to account for positions on the
yield curve, a dummy for EMBI Global bond yields, and a dummy for spread changes that
need to be measured over weekends as those correspond to longer intervals in terms of
calendar days.
4 Results
4.1 Existence of cross-border spillover effects
Table 1 shows baseline estimation results on the existence of cross-border effects for upgrades
and downgrades, respectively. We start with a parsimonious specification in Model 1, which
only contains our main variable of interest, the large-change dummy LARGE and initial
ratings. We then control for potential anticipation effects from watchlistings as well as
clustering within and across countries in Model 2. Finally, Model 3 also accounts for global
market turbulence, or risk aversion.
The key result is that the large-change dummy has the expected sign for both upgrades
(ie, negative) and downgrades (ie, positive), and that it is highly significant in both cases.
Moreover, this finding appears to be remarkably robust as the coefficient on LARGE is
very stable and retains its significance across specifications. Comparison of the absolute
coefficients, however, indicates an asymmetry in the spillover effects induced by upgrades
and downgrades, respectively. Downgrades of two notches or more are associated with an
average spread change over the event window which exceeds that of one-notch downgrades
by about 2 basis points. In contrast, large upgrades are associated with spread changes
that are roughly 1.2 basis points below those of one-notch upgrades. The asymmetry is
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also reflected in the lower significance levels for upgrades despite a larger number of rating
events and observations.
Asymmetries in the reactions to positive and negative events have frequently been docu-
mented in the literature. For instance, Gande and Parsley (2005) find for a 1990s sample of
developed and emerging countries that negative rating events in one country affect sovereign
bond spreads in others whereas there is no discernible impact for positive events. Similar
results have been obtained regarding the direct effects in sovereign bond and CDS markets
(Afonso et al., 2012; Larra´ın et al., 1997), mirroring a well-established finding from event
studies on bond, stock, and CDS returns in the corporate sector (eg, Norden and Weber,
2004; Steiner and Heinke, 2001; Goh and Ederington, 1993; Hand et al., 1992). Recently,
however, there has also been evidence of symmetric spillover reactions to sovereign rating
announcements in the foreign exchange market (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), or even
that positive announcements in emerging countries have both stronger direct and spillover
effects in sovereign CDS markets (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010).
Turning to the rating-environment controls, neither the initial rating of the event country
just before the rating announcement nor the difference in initial ratings between event and
non-event country seem to play a role in terms of spillover effects. Both coefficients are
far from significant across specifications. Previous evidence on this has been inconclusive.
While Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) and Ferreira and Gama (2007) detect stronger spillover
effects in the foreign exchange and stock markets, respectively, for event countries with lower
initial ratings, Gande and Parsley (2005) find the opposite for bond market reactions (to
sovereign downgrades).
We do find some evidence, though, that the impact of an actual rating change on spreads
depends on whether it has been foreshadowed by a watchlisting. The corresponding dummy,
OnWatch, is signed as expected for both upgrades and downgrades, yet there is again
an asymmetry: the control variable turns out insignificant in all upgrade specifications
but significant at almost the five per cent level for downgrades (Model 2 in Panel B). A
possible explanation for this is given by Altman and Rijken (2006). They point out that
watchlistings partially ease the tension between the market’s expectation of rating stability
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and the demand for rating timeliness. This suggests that watchlistings contribute to the
anticipation of actual rating changes. Given that investors tend to be more concerned
about negative news, watchlistings should be more important in building anticipation for
downgrades than for upgrades. Figures from our dataset support this notion. While about
a third of all downgrades are preceded by a watchlisting, so are only 15 per cent of all
upgrades. Finally, it has often been noted that there is an incentive to leak good news
(eg, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Christopher et al., 2012; Gande and Parsley, 2005; Goh
and Ederington, 1993; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986), so the relevance of watchlistings in
building anticipation is conceivably much lower in the case of upgrades. We interpret the
fact that our results are consistent with this literature as reassuring in terms of the validity
of the regression specifications.
Our results also point to the importance of the clustering of rating announcements, es-
pecially for downgrades. While the controls for both clustering within (SimActsWdwEvt)
and across countries (SimActsDayNonEvt) are highly significant in the downgrade regres-
sions, the effect of across-clustering is only marginally significant once for upgrades. This
appears plausible in light of the stylised facts presented in 2.2 because simultaneous an-
nouncements on several countries by one or more agencies occur much less frequently for
upgrades than for downgrades. Moreover, the coefficients are correctly signed for both up-
grades and downgrades, suggesting that the spread-decreasing (spread-increasing) spillover
effects of an upgrade (downgrade) are all the more pronounced when one or more upgrades
(downgrades) are announced for the “non-event” country at the same time.
A similar statement regarding the signs cannot be made with the same degree of confidence
for SimActsWdwEvt, which measures the number of upgrades (downgrades) announced by
other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective upgrade (downgrade).12 While
we again find strong differences in significance between upgrades and downgrades as well
12In choosing the window length, we follow Gande and Parsley (2005) who employ a two-week duration
for a comparable control variable. However, using a one-week or three-week window instead does not alter
the conclusions. Moreover, the reader may note that we do not report a variable capturing similar rating
announcements made on the same day by other agencies. This is due to the unattractive property that
this variable drops out in the upgrade regressions since there is not a single event of multiple upgrades of
a country on the same day in our sample. Therefore, in the interest of comparability, we choose not to
report downgrade regressions with that control either. These regressions show, however, that the measure
is always insignificant for downgrades, regardless of whether it is included in addition to, or as a stand-in
for, SimActsWdwEvt. All results are available on request.
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as opposing signs, one need not necessarily expect within-clustering to have an additional
spread-increasing effect over the event window for downgrades. Instead, the variable might
subsume two opposing effects. On the one hand, the clustering of downgrades over a short
interval could imply that any announcement is less relevant individually. In that case, one
would expect a negative coefficient. On the other hand, clustering is much more prevalent
in crisis times (see 2.2). Thus, SimActsWdwEvt tends to be higher in times of market
turbulence or global risk aversion when spreads against a “safe-haven” investment like US
Treasuries are upward-trending, too (eg, Gonza´lez-Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 2008; Garc´ıa-
Herrero and Ort´ız, 2006; International Monetary Fund, 2004, 2006). As this is consistent
with a positive sign, the significantly positive coefficients for downgrades suggest that we
may be picking up a substantial turbulence component.
Since the literature provides little guidance on whether this is what is driving our results,
we include the S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX ), a commonly used proxy for global risk
aversion (De Santis, 2012). As expected, its coefficient is positive and significant for both
upgrades and downgrades, given the relation between market turbulence and yield spread
drift. Interestingly, the coefficient on SimActsWdwEvt is still positive but slightly lower
than before. This may be due to VIX picking up some of the turbulence effect previously
captured by SimActsWdwEvt. Hence, there is indeed evidence that clustering may also
reduce the spillover relevance of individual rating events that take place in a period of many
similar announcements by other CRAs.
Finally, we subject our baseline regressions for downgrades to a number of robustness checks,
all of which are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. First, we address extreme rating
events. One might be concerned, for instance, that grouping all downgrades of two notches
or more into a single bin could obscure the impact of a very few severe rating changes
that might be driving our results (see Figure 5). However, this is not the case as dropping
downgrades of four notches or more and three notches or more, respectively, leaves the
findings unchanged.
Second, we ensure that the results on negative spillovers are not merely the product of
specific crisis episodes, namely the eurozone crisis of 2010/11 and the Asian financial crisis
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of 1997/98. Again, our results appear to be more general as the key coefficient of interest
remains robust to controlling for these two crises.
Third, in 3.1 we have already argued that an estimation bias due to different degrees of trust
being placed in the three CRAs is unlikely by pointing to the distribution of the severity
of rating changes across agencies in Figure A.1 (see the Appendix). However, the figure
also shows that S&P stands out as the agency which is far less likely than the other two
CRAs to issue a large downgrade conditional on announcing any downgrade at all (only
32 out of 210 negative announcements). By virtue of their relative rarity, S&P’s large
downgrades might hint at particularly strong deteriorations in a country’s creditworthiness
and thus incite especially strong reactions as well. One might therefore be concerned that
those might account for our baseline result.13 Yet, controlling for this does nothing to alter
the conclusion of significant cross-border spillover effects of sovereign rating downgrades in
general.
4.2 Spillover channels
After providing evidence for the existence of spillover effects in the sovereign bond market, in
particular for downgrades, we now turn to potential channels of those spillovers. While the
regressions presented so far control for a multiplicity of factors pertaining to event and non-
event countries on their own, they do not — with the exception of ∆InitRat — account for
bilateral characteristics of event and non-event countries. However, bond market reactions
in the wake of rating announcements in other countries might differ depending on similarities
and bilateral linkages, which may be highly relevant from the perspective of policymakers.
We therefore augment our final baseline specification (Model 3 in Table 1) by whether the
event and non-event country belong to the same geographical region (Region), whether they
are members of a common major trade bloc (TradeBloc), and the importance of the event
13Moreover, some studies, such as Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), continue to single out S&P and ignore
other CRAs’ announcements on the grounds that early research into sovereign credit rating announcements
found S&P’s to be less anticipated (eg, Gande and Parsley, 2005; Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999). It is
worth emphasising, though, that an agency such as Fitch, for example, only entered the business as late as
1994. Therefore, not only were there no corresponding rating actions to examine by earlier studies to begin
with but it is also quite conceivable that part of S&P’s alleged special position was eroded over time. The
summary of more recent research provided in Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) also suggests that there is no
single agency whose announcements are generally more relevant than those of the other two CRAs.
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country as an export destination for the non-event country (ExpImpEvt). We also account
for the degree of financial integration by the event and non-event country’s capital account
openness (CapOpenEvt and CapOpenNonEvt). Finally, we consider the size of the event
country’s GDP (SizeEvt) as well as differences between event and non-event countries in
terms of GDP (∆Size) and trend growth (∆TrendGrowth). Definitions and sources for all
control variables are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix. The results are shown in Tables
2 and 3.
There is again a notable asymmetry between the findings on upgrades and those on down-
grades. This applies to both the results on the potential channels themselves and to the
impact that the inclusion of additional controls has on the robustness of our baseline find-
ings. Whereas the results for downgrades are highly stable and intuitive, they paint a more
nuanced picture for upgrades.
In more detail, we find consistently that spillover effects are significantly stronger within the
same region in the case of downgrade announcements. The coefficient on Region has the
correct sign, indicating that borrowing costs increase by up to almost four basis points more
for non-event countries in the same region as the event country than for those outside it.
Our findings appear plausible since countries in the same geographical region are more likely
to share institutional or cultural characteristics and to have important real and financial
links to one another. Apart from fundamental factors, a more mundane explanation might
posit that financial markets simply find non-event countries from the same region “guilty
by association”. The results are also in line with a number of studies which focus on one
or more particular regions from the start (eg, Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Arezki et al.,
2011; De Santis, 2012). Surprisingly, we obtain positive coefficients for upgrades as well,
which would suggest that those are less likely to induce spillovers within than across regions.
While one could imagine that belonging to a particular region does not matter for upgrade
announcements due to an asymmetric perception by investors, the fact that the coefficients
are often significant is not easily rationalised. On a positive note, though, the magnitude
for upgrades is only about a third of that for downgrades. Therefore, in the interest of
comparability and as an important economic control, we retain Region in all specifications.
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The two trade controls, ie common membership in a major trade bloc (TradeBloc) and the
non-event country’s ratio of exports to the event country to domestic GDP (ExpImpEvt),
are signed as expected throughout, pointing to more pronounced spillover effects for both
upgrades and downgrades when such linkages exist, or when they are stronger. However,
they are only mildly significant once for upgrades (see Model 7 in Table 2). Moreover, the
stability in magnitude and significance of Region upon inclusion of the trade variables, in
particular for downgrades, seems to indicate that stronger spillover effects within regions
cannot easily be explained by real linkages.14
Besides real linkages, we would ideally also like to control directly for bilateral financial
linkages, eg the exposure of non-event country investors to event country sovereign bonds.
Unfortunately, even use of the most comprehensive data from the IMF’s Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Survey leads to a massive reduction in the number of observations and
major selection effects along the time series and country dimensions, which renders virtu-
ally impossible any comparison with the baseline results.
However, to the extent that trade also captures a notable portion of variation in bilateral
asset holdings, our findings for real linkages also hold for financial linkages. As shown
by Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), there is indeed strong evidence that trade is a powerful
determinant of bilateral (bank) asset holdings.15 The disadvantage of using trade as a proxy
for financial linkages is, however, that we cannot discriminate between the effects of real
and financial linkages.
To get an idea of the distinct impact of financial linkages, we therefore approximate financial
integration by the degree of the event and non-event country’s capital account openness as
measured by the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006).16 While this index cannot be used
to gauge the effects of bilateral financial linkages, it is still interesting in its own right to
look at and control for the level effects. The results show that the event country’s capital
14The fact that the correlation of the two trade variables with the region control is low does not support
multicollinearity as a technical explanation for this result. Moreover, replacing ExpImpEvt by other proxies
for bilateral trade does not change the picture either. These results are available upon request.
15In addition, through its correlation with FDI, trade may proxy for cross-country bank exposure since
bank lending may follow domestic companies when those set up operations abroad (eg, Goldberg and
Saunders, 1980, 1981; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998).
16We choose this index due to its broad coverage over time, which allows us to maintain comparability
with the baseline results. The index has also been used extensively in recent literature (eg, Frankel et al.,
2013; Fratzscher, 2012; Hale and Spiegel, 2012).
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account openness tends to significantly amplify cross-border spillover effects. Since bonds of
financially open countries should be more likely to be held by foreign investors, this result
is highly intuitive.
The evidence on the remaining potential channels is succinctly summarised for downgrades.
In no specification do the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt), its increment over
that of the non-event country (∆Size), or differences in trend growth between event and
non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) turn out to be significant determinants of the strength
of bond market spillovers. At the same time, all results from the baseline and augmented
baseline regressions (Models 1 and 2 in Table 3) prove remarkably stable in terms of both
magnitude and significance.
This contrasts with the corresponding findings for upgrades. On the one hand, we obtain
a number of interesting results for the size and growth controls. On the other hand, the
augmented regressions raise some doubts on our main variable of interest, LARGE, in terms
of statistical significance. The latter alternates between specifications and vanishes in some,
yet in view of the considerably stronger baseline results for downgrades, this is not en-
tirely surprising. It merely serves to underscore the asymmetry that exists between positive
and negative rating changes. However, this also means that the evidence on the potential
channels for upgrades should be taken with a grain of salt.
In this regard, the most interesting result is probably the observation that, given the event
country’s size and initial rating, positive spillovers are larger the smaller the non-event
country relative to the event country (∆Size). The magnitude of the coefficient suggests
that non-event countries which are half (two-thirds) the size of the event country experience
an additional positive spillover effect of about four (two) basis points, as compared to non-
event countries as large as the event country.17 While the effect appears to be relatively
small, its direction is still interesting, in particular when viewed in conjunction with the
fact that, across the whole sample, larger and more highly rated countries induce smaller
spillovers (Models 5 to 7 in Table 2). This would be consistent with a world in which
17∆Size is defined as the difference between the event and non-event country’s log GDPs or, equivalently,
the log of the ratio of the two GDP levels. Therefore, a decrease in relative non-event country size by
half (two-thirds) amounts to an increase in ∆Size of about one hundred (fifty) per cent. With an absolute
coefficient of roughly 0.04, the (semi-elasticity) marginal effects therefore obtain as four and two basis points,
respectively.
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positive spillover effects matter primarily within a group of small developed and emerging
countries but less so within a group of large, developed countries, and in which the latter
have little impact on the former. The insignificance of the absolute difference in trend GDP
growth rates between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) as a further measure
of differences in economic development does nothing to contradict this interpretation. In
view of the generally more ambiguous results for upgrades, however, we do not wish to
overemphasise this point.
4.3 Discussion
Our results can be condensed into the following stylised facts. First, there is strong evidence
of statistically significant, negative spillover effects of downgrade announcements. This
result proves highly robust to controlling for anticipation through watchlistings and the
clustering of rating announcements. Second, negative spillover effects are more pronounced
among countries in a common region, which cannot be explained by measurable fundamental
links and similarities between countries. Third, reactions to upgrades are, if anything, much
more muted than for downgrades, suggesting important asymmetries in the sovereign bond
market’s treatment of the two types of announcements. Fourth, evidence on the channels
behind positive spillover effects, if any, offers a more complex picture and appears relatively
ambiguous.
So, which conclusion to draw from this? To begin with, there is a strong case for the notion
that negative sovereign rating announcements, ie those of most concern to policymakers, do
matter in inducing spillovers across markets. Such is the outcome of the explicit identifi-
cation strategy used in this paper, which demonstrates that, all other things equal, “large”
downgrades of two notches or more cause larger hikes in spreads than “small” one-notch
downgrades. This suggests a role for CRAs and their actions in sovereign bond markets, be
it through the revelation of new information on creditworthiness which acts as a “wake-up
call” for investors to reassess fundamentals in other countries (Goldstein, 1998), or simply
by providing a coordinating signal that shifts expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium
(Boot et al., 2006; Masson, 1998).
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However, a major regulatory focus on the activities of CRAs would also require negative
spillover effects of substantial economic magnitude. In this paper, we find the incremental
impact of “large” downgrades to be a little over two basis points, which may appear limited
at first glance. Yet, it is important to note that this does not represent the total effect that
policymakers would be concerned about. This can be thought of as consisting of a “base
effect” that “small” downgrades have, compared to a benchmark scenario of no downgrades
anywhere, plus an additional impact for “large” downgrades — which is what we measure.
Of course, the reason we focus on the latter lies in the impossibility of cleanly identifying the
“base effects” of rating changes unless one rules out the existence of rating-induced spillovers
from the beginning (see the discussion in 3.1). Nonetheless, the total effect is conceivably a
multiple of the one we estimate. At factors of 2 and 5, for instance, the implied total effects
amount to approximately 4 and 10 basis points, respectively. To put this into perspective,
the average sovereign bond spread vis-a`-vis US Treasuries at the time of the downgrade
announcements in our sample is 3.25 per cent, or 325 basis points. While the total effect
of downgrades is relatively small in comparison, one has to bear in mind that governments
often need to refinance large amounts of debt, which magnifies the impact of even small
spread differences. Moreover, there is still a regional effect of up to 4 basis points on top of
that, suggesting that concerns about negative spillovers in the sovereign debt market should
not be lightly dismissed.
Finally, from a policymaker’s point of view, the finding that the increased strength of neg-
ative spillovers within regions cannot be explained away by measurable linkages and sim-
ilarities between countries might also be a cause for concern. Even though limited data
availability precludes an all-encompassing analysis of potential channels, there is little to
suggest that one can comfortably rule out that some countries are found “guilty by associa-
tion” with the event country. Moreover, such behaviour on the part of investors would likely
extend to their reactions to news other than rating announcements. While it is hard to see
an obvious remedy, the potential problem would seem to be much more general and, above
all, rooted in investor behaviour. Hence, it is not clear that putting the primary emphasis
on CRAs will prove effective in this regard.
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5 Conclusion
Concerns about negative spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of sovereign
rating changes have recently resurfaced on the agenda of policymakers. In this paper, we
study the existence and potential channels of such spillover effects. More specifically, we
avail of an extensive dataset which covers all sovereign rating announcements made by the
three major agencies and daily sovereign bond market movements of up to 73 developed
and emerging countries between 1994 and 2011. Based on this, we propose an explicit
counterfactual identification strategy which compares the bond market reactions to small
changes in an agency’s assessment of a country’s creditworthiness to those induced by all
other, more major revisions. In doing so, we account for a number of factors that might
impact on the reception of individual announcements.
We find strong evidence in favour of negative cross-border spillovers in the wake of sovereign
downgrades. At the same time, there is no similarly robust indication as to positive spillovers
since reactions to upgrades are much more muted at best, which points to an important
asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment of positive and negative information.
Regarding the channels of negative spillover effects, our results suggest that those are more
pronounced for countries within the same region. Strikingly, however, this cannot be ex-
plained by fundamental linkages and similarities, such as trade, which turn out to be in-
significant.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that policymakers’ concerns about negative spillover
effects are not unfounded. In fact, the lack of power of a set of fundamentals in explaining
the added regional component may reinforce, or give rise to, concerns about the ability of
investors to discriminate accurately between sovereigns. This could also be of more general
interest because such behaviour is likely to carry over to reactions to various kinds of non-
CRA news in other markets and sectors, too. Hence, important though they are, a sole
focus on CRAs and their actions might be missing a bigger picture.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of rating changes, by agency
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